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Food Additives: Legal Recognition of a
Scientific Problem
Robert E. Post*
F OOD ADDITIVES COULD CREATE one of the nicest legal problems
that courts have ever had to face. We are not concerned
with theories of negligence, warranty, privity, or statutory in-
terpretation as it applies to any of these three concepts. The real
problem is twofold: establishment of harm arising from the
presence of an additive or additives; and establishment of a ju-
dicial policy to contemplate the fact that, if and when such harm
does befall someone, it will happen in spite of the utmost good
faith on the part of the manufacturer, and in the face of legisla-
tive and administrative authorization of the use of such additives.
Product liability in general has been well treated in this law
review and elsewhere.' Liberal treatment by the courts of im-
plied warranty of merchantable quality2 and disregard of privity
3
make the supplier and manufacturer liable for anything the jury
may find wrong with the product that makes it unfit for the gen-
eral purpose intended. Such a finding is almost automatic in the
case of a harmful ingredient in food. Hence the importance of a
substantial basis for establishing cause and effect.
If, notwithstanding the best efforts of manufacturers and
governmental agencies, it should turn out that some common,
supposedly innocuous food additive has been poisoning people for
many years, an economic explosion could result under the liberal
holdings in implied warranty. It would seem that we need some
legal ground rules now to guide all concerned. Otherwise, in-
stead of resolving the problem so as to serve the ends of justice
rationally and nobly, we may hopelessly bungle things with con-
fused decisions resting on vindictiveness, hindsight or defensive
subterfuge.
Evidence of cause and effect is related to the technological
and scientific aspects of the problem. But science and technology
are also fundamentally necessary in establishing a reasonable
* B.E. in Chemical Engineering, Yale University; M.S. in Chemical Engi-
neering, University of Wisconsin; Ph.D. in Physical Chemistry, University
of Illinois; second year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School. The
writer's experience with statistical inference arises in connection with
work in viscose rayon where the problems are much like those of food
additives in principle.
1 See for example Advertised-Product Liability, 8 Clev-Mar. L. R. 1.
2 Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N. Y. 388, 175 N. E. 105, 74
A. L. R. 339 (1931).
3 Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S. W. 2nd 828, 142
A. L. R. 1479 (1942).
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policy. Unfortunately, science is not so exact as it is supposed
to be, and it is unlikely that sufficiently complete agreement will
ever be found among scientists to serve as a useful guide in truly
borderline matters. The doubtful areas are the crux of the pres-
ent food additives problem. Here only long periods of time and
large amounts of data will suffice to provide anything approach-
ing a conclusive answer. In the meantime we must depend on
scientific reasoning and conjecture. Whatever the popular con-
ception of scientists may be, they do take their prejudices into
their laboratories. Yet it is fortunate that they do, for many im-
portant discoveries are the outcome of the pursuit of a course of
action founded only on the scientist's faith in his own convictions
-convictions not shared by his contemporaries, nor supported by
available data. All of which is to say that the facts of life are
not much changed by scientific discipline. A prejudice may be
"right" or "wrong." Ultimately it may be "good" or "bad." A
nation of eccentrics would destroy itself in internal chaos. A
nation of reasonable men would vegetate. The true wisdom, so
essential to a solution to the problem which will best serve the
nation, is no easier to locate in connection with food additives
than it is with affairs of state. The label of scientist is only a
rudimentary qualification.
The concepts of sufficient data and a best course of action to
follow in absence of it are fundamental to scientific inquiry. With
sufficient data, a statistical evaluation can be made from which
quantitative conclusions can be drawn. Otherwise we proceed
through hypothesis and inference applied to experiments whose
outcome can be determined with satisfying certainty. It is the
general contrast of induction and deduction.
The result obtained from statistical evaluation of data is a
statement of the probability that the outcome observed could
have occurred by chance. It is here the old adage that figures
don't lie but liars figure is especially appropriate. It must also
be emphasized that statistics only reveal an association-never
cause and effect. Cause and effect must be inferred with more
or less justification as the case may be. The justification is usually
quite adequate when a certain result is strongly associated with
an applied treatment and coincidence is eliminated. The statisti-
cal method is necessary when it is either impossible or too im-
practical to control all conditions adequately. Usually adequate
control is obtainable only with highly restricted laboratory ex-
periments, and even then, if the subject has inherent variability,
such control may be impossible on any scale no matter how re-
stricted. Fortunately many avenues of research are available
that lead to unequivocal results. That is to say the results are
unequivocal, although their interpretation may not be. Argu-
ments over interpretation lead to additional experiments to con-
firm or refute various interpretations until some interpretation
becomes generally accepted. Often, as in the case of drugs, clini-




the laboratory workers that ultimate failures on the mass scale
are virtually unknown. Hence we may be encouraged by the
knowledge that, although mass data on the effects of food addi-
tives are not readily available for the purpose required, there is
an abundant fund of good chemistry available to provide guidance
in the selection or rejection of chemicals that find their way into
our food supply.
In what has preceded, we have defined the scope of the food
additives problem for the purposes of this article, and we have
attempted to introduce in a general way the place of science and
scientists in relation to the problem. We will proceed to con-
sider further the matter of statistical inference, particularly as it
bears relation to evidence of cause and effect. We will take a
look at judicial and legislative policy as reflected in Supreme
Court decisions, legislative history of the Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act, and a few of the leading case-book cases on liability
in implied warranty. Finally we will review science and law
and common sense with a view to suggesting a suitable course
to follow.
Statistical Inference
The application of statistical methods is only one part of the
overall concept of an experiment or population study. The first
step is the proper design of the experiment. The design is im-
portant whether or not statistical methods are to be used. In
the first place coincidental factors must be eliminated or ac-
counted for, otherwise there could be a multiplicity of possible
causes assigned to any given effect. Secondly, an experiment
should be designed to be as efficient as possible; that is to yield
as much useful data for a given amount of work, time and ex-
pense as ingenuity can accomplish. With the increased applica-
tion of statistical methods to analyze data, this matter of ef-
ficiency has become both more important and more apparent,
particularly when interactions of factors must be determined. A
third and very important consideration is sampling. Proper
sampling is essential to controlled experiments, and absolutely
indispensable to population studies, the best known examples of
which are the political polls.
Needless to say, the actual performance of an experiment or
survey of the population is an important part of the whole, but
the requirements involved are more of technique than principle.
Given an adequate design and proper performance, one will ob-
tain certain results or data, and these results or data will be sub-
ject to more or less error because of the impossibility of obtain-
ing absolute precision. The province of statistics is to evaluate
quantitatively the significance of the results. However, this evalu-
ation of significance is relevant only to the internal relations of
the experiment. Effects of coincidence or systematic errors in
measurement will not be revealed. Interpretation of the results
is anything but automatic. Obtaining the correct interpretation
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depends not only on faultless design and accurate data, but also
on the objectivity of the interpreter. This is so even in physical
experiments where the data are often so precise as not to re-
quire statistical analysis.
Since the element of interpretation is so basic to the prob-
lem at hand, we will pursue it a bit further into the field of
"exact" sciences before we consider some practical applications in
the fields of physiology and biochemistry. The interpretation of
certain astronomical phenomena escaped astronomers and physi-
cists for many years. The data simply did not fit existing theory;
and the discrepancy might have been attributed to experimental
error, although, to be sure, scientists were reluctant to do so. It
remained for Einstein's theory of relativity to provide a satis-
fying explanation. In this case the data were more precise than
the theory, and interpretation depended on a better theory, which,
indeed, brought about a revolution in scientific thought, as is well
known. As another example, the relations of various forms of
energy are summarized in the mathematically precise science of
thermodynamics, but through thermodynamics' half-brother,
statistical mechanics, we find that this precision exists only be-
cause the probability of things being otherwise is so small as to
be inconsequential. This state of affairs comes about only be-
cause we deal with numbers of molecules far exceeding the
pennies in the national debt. There are not enough people, guinea
pigs or even insects in the world to enable us to approach this
precision in the life sciences. A final illustration of the, importance
of the nature of the system is a contribution of the atomic and
nuclear physicists. It has been found, a priori, that when deal-
ing with the order of magnitude of atoms and nuclei that it is im-
possible both to determine the position of a particle on this scale
and also to determine its velocity, even though precision is un-
limited as to either alone. Fortunately this effect is vanishingly
small on the familiar scale; otherwise a batter, if he had any
idea at all how fast the pitcher was throwing the ball, might just
as well swing with his eyes closed. Now, this digression from
the immediate statistical field may seem superfluous. However, its
purpose is to emphasize and reemphasize the objective limita-
tions of physical sciences. When we add to these the subjective
limitations of scientists, and consider that food additives lie in a
field far removed in precision from those mentioned, and one
that is furthermore far less amenable to a priori analysis, it is
abundantly apparent that much work and experience lies ahead
before any reliable conclusions can be drawn.
A popular text on the subject of statistics is Statistics, A New
Approach4 . This particular text is especially useful because it
sets out the problem in many concrete examples. One of these
is quite pertinent in that it involves the effect of vitamin sup-
plements in the diet of soldiers on their performance in the field.




The handling of this study is illuminating, and although we can-
not go into it here in great detail, some of the factors can be
listed by way of illustration of the general discussion given above.
This was an expensive experiment. It was performed because
there was reason to believe from studies on rats and to a lesser
extent on humans that vitamins might enable soldiers better to
withstand extreme cold. But to begin with, combat activity could
not be simulated and a substitute had to be devised. Then too,
it was desirable to have a quantitative measure of effect, hence
the vagaries of actual combat would almost necessarily be pre-
cluded. The limited number of men placed a limitation on how
much could be investigated. As a result it was decided to study
the combined effects of vitamins B and C. The effect of either
alone or their interaction with each other had to be left out. The
sampling could not be done at random for administrative reasons,
so the risk had to be run that coincidence might arise from the
choice of volunteers from a particular group.
However, once this group was formed, it was divided into
two groups randomly, one of which received the vitamins and
the other constituted a control group. To eliminate psychological
factors both groups received capsules, but only one received
vitamins in their capsules. The effect of the vitamins was meas-
ured as a relative score on physical fitness tests before and after
the experiment; thus we have a control group as to vitamins and
a control reference as to performance. There were many psycho-
logical features to be circumvented. Chief reliance was placed
on interplatoon competition as an offsetting factor.
In conducting the experiment records were kept of food in-
take, physical performance and incidental observations. The
menu, barracks conditions, uniforms and activities all had to be
according to plan.
The results before analysis showed that both groups actually
improved considerably in spite of limited diet and hard work.
Since it was by no means obvious that vitamins were helpful, a
statistical evaluation had to be made. As was mentioned before
statistics measures the probability of the observed difference in
average scores happening by chance. In other words, if a group
similar to the group that received no vitamins in the actual ex-
periment were to be put through the same experiment, one
would not expect to obtain the same average score. From the
distribution of scores making up the average, the probability of
obtaining any given different score, including the score actually
obtained by the group receiving vitamins in the experiment, can
be estimated. In this experiment the probability turned out to
be 17 times in 100-about 1 in 6, or the probability of throwing
a one-spot on a die. Now, one does not have to be trained in any
science to make a judgment on this basis. If for example, you
want to determine if a die is loaded, you might throw it once and
get a two. If on the second throw, you get another two, the odds
being 1 in 6 that this will happen by chance, will you conclude
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the die is loaded? You will probably want to throw it at least
once more, when the odds will be 1 in 36, before drawing any
conclusion.
In this test, some associations obtained from the data were
considered significant, but on the whole a beneficial effect of
vitamins was not established. Furthermore the effect of vitamins
in relation to combat inactivity with its manifest psychological
implications could not be estimated at all, because it was not in-
cluded in the original design. However there is some indication
of benefit, and it could be that the real benefit would be to enable
the weakest to survive. About this we can only conjecture.
These authors also discuss the association between smoking
and lung cancer. A survey showed a lung cancer death rate
about nine times as great for pack-a-day or more smokers as for
non smokers. However analysis of the data also showed a 30%
lower death rate in the sample as a whole than that for the
United States generally, the death rate for heavy smokers even
being below the national rate. Such results suggest selectivity in
the sample. A possible explanation would be that the sample
consisted of a smaller proportion of those on the verge of death
than the national average, and, in the portion destined to be the
survivors, a lower proportion of smokers than the national aver-
age. Some would say that this is far fetched, especially since
other smaller scale studies seem to confirm the association. But
it is pointed out that such selectivity could very likely be com-
mon to all the surveys.5 At any rate, this is still only an associa-
tion, strong as it may be. It is still possible that heavy smoking
and lung cancer are common effects from the same cause. To
suppress the possible influence of coincidence it would be neces-
sary to select two groups at random and cause one to smoke at
least a pack a day while preventing the other from smoking at
all. This truly verges on the ludicrous, at least in our society.
While the experts argue this matter pro and con, it is well for the
rest of us to keep in mind the vast areas of uncertainty involved
and to realize that no one can be expected to view such a personal
subject without some prejudice.
Judicial and Legislative Policy
Recent litigation in the Federal Courts over the coloring of
oranges6 brings the food additive situation sharply into focus be-
cause it concerns the economic necessity of applying a non-harm-
less coal tar color to the skins of oranges in the absence of any
scientific evidence of the likelihood of injury to man. Also such
oranges are stamped "color added". Note that there is something
5 The original data was reported by Hammond and Horn, The Relation be-
tween Human Smoking Habits and Death Rates, 155 J. A. M. A. 1316 (1954).
*The analysis as to selectivity was by Berkson, The Statistical Study of
Association between Smoking and Lung Cancer, 30 Proc. Staff Mtgs. Mayo
Clinic 319 (1955).




special about coal tar colors. Being "unnatural", they are espe-
cially suspect when it comes to their use in food. We also note
that the issue of economic necessity arises here, which would be
shocking to consider at all in connection with possible poisons in
food-except that there is no evidence that man is likely to be
poisoned in this case. Furthermore, the color is in the skin, and
the consumer is given notice that color has been added. This can
hardly be called an insidious deception practiced on the helpless
consumer.
The treatment of this problem by Congress and the Federal
Courts is perhaps the best source of enlightenment as to public
policy on the matter of food additives. Recall that we here con-
fine our consideration of food additives to what may be called
legitimate or bona fide uses. We avoid the general subject, which
includes the use of additives to deceive as to quality or the negli-
gent or willful use of known dangerous chemicals in known
harmful amounts. We do generalize however as to the meaning
of additive and include all chemicals that may enter food, from
those used agriculturally to those emanating from the wrapper
or container. Oppenheim, in this law review,7 and the U. S. De-
partment of Health Education and Welfare, in a pamphlet for
consumers,8 have set out many of the uses and sources of food
additives.
The original Food and Drug Act 9 prohibited and defined
adulteration of food. In United States v. Lexington Mill & Ele-
vator Co.10 it became necessary for the Supreme Court to con-
strue Sec. 7, fifth subdivision which read as follows (the italics
are the Supreme Court's):
Fifth. If it contains any added poisonous or other added
deleterious ingredient which may render such article injuri-
ous to health.
In this case flour bleached with nitrogen peroxide gas had been
seized in shipment in interstate commerce. The flour contained
residual nitrogen peroxide and various reaction products of a
poisonous nature. The trial court charged the jury
... that the government need not prove that this flour, or
foodstuffs made by the use of it, would injure the health of
any consumer. It is the character-not the quantity-of the
added substance, if any, which is to determine this case.
The Supreme Court applied the rules of construction that (1)
the province of construction lies wholly within the domain of
7 Oppenheim, Food Additive Law and Practice, 8 Clev-Mar. L. R. 516
(1959).
8 Leaflet No. 10, U. S. Dept of Health, Education, and Welfare, FDA, Wash.
25, D. C.
9 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
10 34 S. Ct. 337, 232 U. S. 399 (1914).
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ambiguity and (2) significance and effect shall, if possible, be ac-
corded to every word. It found that the charge of the trial court
in effect omitted the import of the italicized words above. The
court then held that this placed the burden of proving possible
injury to health on the government. However it construed the
word "may" broadly so as to contemplate any use of the food and
any person using it. The court quoted Senator Heyburn,12 chair-
man of the Senate committee, who expressed the point of view
that "poisonous" is a matter of quantity and combination.
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,13 in the
light of experience, codified the practice under the 1906 Act and
introduced more specific matter as well as some new provisions
on procedure for establishing tolerances. Use of coal tar colors
was forbidden unless the color was from a batch certified on the
basis of being harmless and suitable for use in food by the Secre-
tary of Agriculture.14 The practice of strictness as to coal tar
colors had developed in administration of the 1906 Act. How-
ever, the Secretary was given the power of determining the safe
limits as to other additives, if they were required in manufac-
ture or could not be avoided.15 Compliance avoided liability un-
der the issue of the Lexington Mill case 16 as to possible injury to
health. A procedure for establishment of regulations 7 and re-
view of controversial orders by the Secretary 8 was set up. When
the coal tar color litigation over Red 32 began in 1956, the 1938
act was still the law, although the Food and Drug Administration
had been transferred to the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare. Before it was to end, a special temporary law and
an extension of time to it had been passed, and the 1938 act had
been substantially amended, although not as to coal tar colors.
The litigation over the use of coal tar colors on oranges arose
when FD and C Red No. 32, among others, was delisted Novem-
ber 10, 1955, effective February 10, 1956. The delisting had been
done after appropriate hearings on the basis that these colors
were no longer considered harmless, and when various inter-
ested parties petitioned for a rehearing, it was denied by the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Two cases reached
Federal Courts of Appeals, and the petitioners were successful in
getting a bill introduced into Congress to permit temporarily con-
tinued use of Red 32.
11 Id. at 339.
12 40 Cong. Rec. Pt. 2, 1131.
is 52 Stat. 1040, 21 U. S. C. A. Secs. 301-392.
14 Adulteration prohibited in 52 Stat. 1042, 21 U. S. C. A. Sec. 331 (b). Coal
tar color adulteration defined in 52 Stat. 1046, 21 U. S. C. A. Sec. 342 (c).
Coal tar color certification directions in 52 Stat. 1049, 21 U. S. C. A. Sec.
346 (b).
15 52 Stat. 1049, 21 U. S. C. A. Sec. 346 (a).
16 Supra note 10.
17 52 Stat. 1055, 21 U. S. C. A. Sec. 371 (e).




The facts before the courts and before Congress are in
general as indicated at the beginning of this section on Judicial
and Legislative Policy. More specifically, as to being not harm-
less, the evidence showed that ill effects were produced in dogs
at a feeding level of 100 ppm. (parts per million) in their diet,
and that 196 persons had become acutely ill after eating pop-
corn colored with Red 32. The FDA found that man appears
to be more susceptible than test animals to the effects of such
materials, and that there was no evidence of a safe level for
human use. Actually the FDA had not attempted to determine
such a safe level, but on the other hand, the petitioners had
not contributed anything either. In this connection an im-
portant fact to consider is that such coloring materials can
enter the diet from many sources other than oranges.
As to economic necessity, there was little doubt that un-
colored oranges would meet with strong consumer resistances.
As to the matter of there being no evidence of likelihood
of harm to man, there was the fact that coloring of oranges
had been practiced since the early 1930's with no known ill
effects. The maximum rate of human consumption of Red 32
would be through eating candied orange peel containing 7.4
ppm., which would be only a relatively small part of the diet
in contrast to the continuous feeding of 100 ppm. in the total
diet of the test dogs. In orange juice the coloring is present
only as a fractional part per million. Furthermore, petitioners
testified that the only use of Red 32 at that time was in the
coloring of oranges.
The findings of the FDA were not contested by the petition-
ers, nor did the Secretary take any issue with the evidence intro-
duced as to economic necessity or absence of proven harmful-
ness. The issues resolved to ones of statutory construction as to
(1) the sense in which the word "harmless" was to be inter-
preted and (2) the discretionary powers of the secretary in
the event of a finding of harmfulness, in whatever sense the
court finds it should be interpreted.
Pending the outcome of the litigation, Congress concluded
it would not be dangerous to the health of the nation to permit
the continued use of Red 32 under limited circumstances.19 The
limitations were (1) a three year time limit during which it
was expected a harmless color could be found; (2) use re-
stricted to oranges mature and not intended for processing; (3)
oranges so colored to be stamped "color added" so that the
buying public would be fully apprised of the fact. The reason
was plainly and admittedly that Congress felt the risk was
negligible compared to the economic necessity involved.
In the Second Circuit the order of the Secretary was ap-
pealed by a group of dye manufacturers in Certified Color
'9 70 Stat. 512, 21 U. S. C. A. Sec. 342 (c) 2nd proviso. For legislative his-
tory see 2 U. S. Code, Cong., and Adm. News 3055 (1956).
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Industry Committee v. Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare. 20 In the Fifth Circuit it was appealed by a group of
citrus fruit growers and the holder of a patent on the coloring
process in Florida Citrus Exchange v. Folsom.21 Judgment was
for respondents in the Second Circuit and for petitioners in
the Fifth. While it is possible to find distinguishing features in
these cases, largely related to the nature of the petitioners, the
Supreme Court, on certiorari from the Fifth Circuit, found for
the Government without reservation.
22
In Certified Color Industry Committee the Color Industry
argued that the word "harmless" should relate back to the
clause construed in the Lexington Mill case, since this clause
was carried over into the 1938 Act. They further argued for a
less strict interpretation for which they cited Wood Manu-
facturing Co. v. United States23 where the words ". . . as ordi-
narily used . . ." appeared. Thus they would have the statute
interpreted so that harmless would mean such as may render
injurious as ordinarily used. In support of this the Color In-
dustry urged that Congress being aware of the toxicity of coal
tar colors must have realized that the authorized use would
have some relation to quantity, and they pointed out that salt
and vinegar are harmful if taken in sufficient quantity. They
felt that the authorization of limited amounts of poisonous sub-
stances when necessary or unavoidable in good manufacturing
procedure should be permitted in the case of coal tar colors-
that coal tar colors were not to be excepted from this provision;
hence by somewhat circuitous reasoning, "harmless" should be
interpreted as it would be for any other substance.
The Secretary argued for recognition of coal tar colors as
a separate subject of that act-that coal tar colors were to be
definitely excepted from all provisions not specifically mention-
ing them. He submitted that the use of "harmless" instead of
the more familiar statutory language was evidence of Con-
gressional intent to provide an absolute standard for coal tar
colors.
The court reviewed legislative history and analyzed the
whole act in an endeavor to extract the legislative intent. It
was noted that by the terms of the act a substance not added
to food will not render the food adulterated if it does not
ordinarily render the food injurious to health. An added sub-
stance constitutes adulteration if it may render the food injurious
20 236 F. 2nd 866 (2nd Cir. 1956).
21 246 F. 2nd 850 (5th Cir. 1957).
22 Supra note 6.
23 286 F. 84 (7th Cir. 1923). The court spoke of "... when diluted as it is
ordinarily used . . ." in contemplation of possible injury to health. How-
ever, from the opinion it is evident that the court did not overlook the
possible uses of the coloring material involved any more than the court in




to health.24 A coal tar color is permitted only if it is from a
listed batch, and a batch may be listed only when the color is
found harmless and suitable for use in food. However, the
court did not overlook the provision for the Secretary to set
up tolerances for added poisonous or deleterious substances
which are necessary to or cannot be avoided in good manu-
facturing practice. It decided that "harmless" could not stand
alone, but must have some relation back to the above mentioned
concepts of adulteration. But the court rejected the point of view
of the Color Industry, observing that whatever might have been
the significance of the holding in the Wood case as to the concept
of ordinary use, Congress definitely distinguished the test of
ordinary use from that of possibility in the 1938 Act. The court
reflected on the fact that under the 1906 Act the FDA had
recognized the necessity for special treatment of coal tar colors,
and certified only those colors satisfying its specifications. This
history, the strictness implied in the 1938 Act in requiring certifi-
cation of batches, and the wording of the statute led the court
to find that under the agreed facts the delisted coal tar colors
were not harmless. The court apparently applied the Lexington
Mill test in its holding.
In the Florida Citrus Exchange case the Citrus Exchange
argued for an interpretation of "harmless" as applied to use ac-
cording to appropriate regulations of the Secretary; that is a
substance is to be considered harmless if it can be rendered
harmless in a relative sense. The Secretary held to an absolute
standard.
The court purported to look to the entire act, with its de-
clared object and policy to protect the public health, in the light
of certain rules of statutory interpretation which the court set
up as appropriate. These rules were (1) to avoid incongruous
or absurd results, (2) to avoid an interpretation occasioning
inconvenience or producing inequality or injustice in favor of a
more reasonable one, and (3) to examine statutes in pari materia.
On this basis the court concluded that not to construe "harm-
less" in relation to use would be discrimination against the
orange industry. Again the clause in the statute providing for
limited use of poisonous substances necessary to good manu-
facturing practice was introduced in support of interpretation
of "harmless" as a word of relation. This court cited the Certi-
fied Color Industry Committee case as supporting the Lexington
Mill doctrine, and evidently found even less suggestion in the
statute of a unique standard for coal tar colors than that court
did. At least it reported no finding on whether the delisted
colors were harmless or not. (In the dissenting opinion by
Hutcheson, C.J., it was pointed out that in the Lexington Mill
case an entirely different statute was construed.)
24 52 Stat. 1046, 21 U. S. C. A. Sec. 342 (a).
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The Supreme Court considered the Lexington Mill doctrine
(and incidentally cited the Wood case as applying it). It then
examined the statute for evidence of legislative intent much
as had the courts below. The Supreme Court, however, was
struck by the distinctions in the treatment of coal tar colors.
While the language involved in the Lexington Mill case sur-
vived generally in the 1938 Act, a separate test was provided
for coal tar colors. The Supreme Court conceived that it was
competent for Congress in the light of recognized problems to
health to adopt a rule of caution. It was taken that Congress
intended that the Secretary address himself to the harmless
character of the substance first, and thus relieved him of the
burden of proof as in the Lexington Mill case. This would cir-
cumvent the argument of not-proven which seemed to have
great weight in the Florida Citrus Exchange case in the court
below. To the Supreme Court it appeared that Congress had
turned its back on procedures of analyzing the uses made of a
substance and duplicating the proportions experimentally. It
held that "harmless" was to be construed relative to tests such
as were actually conducted on the colors in question.
On the second issue as to the Secretary's discretionary
powers, the courts displayed a similar diversity of reasoning. In
the Certified Color Industry Committee case, the Color Industry
had argued for an interpretation of "harmless" such as would
permit the Secretary to issue regulations for limited use. The
court found the substance not harmless, and thereby was able
to narrow the issue somewhat. As to the Secretary's authority
to permit limited use, the court said that that question need not
be answered. The only question that needed to be answered was
whether, in any case, the petitioners could require him to es-
tablish tolerances. The answer became a matter of review of the
Secretary's findings. The court observed that there was nothing
in the record as to a safe level for humans, that the petitioners
had contributed nothing, and that the Secretary's decision was
reasonable. In fact the court declared that it would be uncon-
scionable to require the Secretary to permit the use of the de-
listed colors without the clearest and most uncompromising
evidence of a safe level of usage. It held that the Secretary's
findings should be accepted. The point was raised that the
danger would be reduced substantially if the Secretary were to
limit the use to a single food. The Secretary claimed no authority
to do this, to which the court seemed to agree, and held that
the Secretary had acted within his discretion. The court sub-
mitted that this was a problem distinct from that before Con-
gress in amending the statute for a temporary specific use.
This decision was duly recognized in the Florida Citrus
Exchange case, where in fact the court seized upon the ob-
servation about Congress and specific use and interpreted it to




dissent held that the distinction should have been between
legislation and litigation.) This court thus proceeded on the
basis of a narrower problem than that of the Color Industry.
Not having placed any construction on the word "harmless"
that would by itself prevent the Secretary from certifying a
color for use, the court concentrated on examination of the
factors involved in establishing a safe level of use. To the
argument that there was a variety of possible uses, the court
replied that this did not seem to be a problem with other poison-
ous substances of equal or greater toxicity, but be that as it
may, the Secretary could limit the use to oranges. The Secretary
contended that he did not have such authority, but the court
merely noted that while there was no such specific authority,
there was no specific prohibition either, and, indeed, the use of
a class of colors known as lakes had at one time been permitted
for use on egg shells only. Thus this court construed the 1938
Act as requiring the Secretary to determine if the color was
required, and where required to determine the quantity that
can be tolerated in that application and to regulate the use ac-
cordingly. (Actually it would appear that restriction to specific
uses is automatic whenever necessity is a requirement.) The
court expressed accord with the view of the court in the Certi-
fied Color Industry Committee case as to a requirement of clear-
est evidence, and suggested resumption of tests, but unqestion-
ably placed the burden on the Secretary to produce some
evidence of harmfulness to humans at any level of use that
might serve the purpose of coloring oranges. The order of the
Secretary was set aside, and the court directed him to restrict
the use to oranges and continue certification of batches. How-
ever, nothing was to be deemed to restrict the Secretary from
determining a safe level. In the eyes of this court no further
legislation was required. (The dissent concluded that this de-
cision was judicial legislation.)
The Supreme Court made short work of the issue of re-
quiring the Secretary to establish tolerances even though the
color was found to be harmless. The court said that the com-
mand of the statute is plain. Where the color is not harmless,
it is not to be certified. Where it is not certified, it is not to be
used at all. The court summed up by asserting that the benefits
of visual appeal do not outweigh the risk to public health. It is
the duty of the Secretary to give effect to the distinction from
other added poisonous materials.
It is clear that there is a difference of opinion among our
courts. It would seem to be more than a difference in political,
social or economic views. It would seem to be associated with
a perhaps unrecognized viewpoint on probability. The court in
the Certified Color Industry Committee case appeared to be
much more concerned with possible harm than did the court
in the Florida Citrus Exchange case. The Supreme Court avoided
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weighing the probabilities by concluding that it was competent
for Congress to adopt a rule of caution.
There also seemed to be a tendency in both lower courts to
construe the statute strictly, apparently as being in derogation
of the common law as set forth in the Lexington Mill doctrine.
Perhaps we shouldn't call this common law, but in any case
prior decisions had more weight than the apparent abrupt change
in statutory expression. The Supreme Court, though, did not
hesitate to accept the Secretary's argument based on the in-
clusion of special paragraphs for coal tar colors and the use
of an unusual word, "harmless."
In the light of these decisions, it can be taken that national
policy according to the Supreme Court is to leave the weighing
of probabilities as much as possible to Congress and the admin-
istrative agencies. That is that economic necessity shall not be
set off against even a small risk, if the statute can be interpreted
otherwise.
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was amended in 1958
to prohibit the use in food of additives which have not been
adequately tested to establish their safety.25 It also permits the
use in foods of additives that would not have been permitted in
the 1938 Act, provided the proposed usages are in amounts ac-
cepted by FDA as safe. We have a reversal of the Lexington
Mill doctrine. The burden of proof is now on the user rather
than the government, but food additives no longer come under
the test of possible injury to health. Instead, a new section has
been added setting out in detail the procedure to establish
safety.
26
The 1958 amendment culminated six years of extensive
hearings. 27 In the process Congress evolved a concept of safety
derived from the testimony of many scientists. At the same
time it became apparent that there existed considerable di-
versity in scientific opinion or judgment factors. (The great
responsibility imposed on the Commissioner of Food and Drugs
was also recognized by an increase in his salary from $17,500
to $20,000 per year.)
As to the concept of safety, in general, proof of reasonable
certainty that no harm will result is the criterion. It is recog-
nized that complete certainty of harmlessness is not attainable.
The Secretary is required to consider probable consumption, di-
rect or indirect, of the additive or by-products; cumulative effect
including effects produced by related substances, and safety fac-
tors applied to the translation to human use of data obtained from
animal experimentation. 28
25 72 Stat. 1784, 3 U. S. Code, Cong., and Adm. News 5300 (1958).
26 72 Stat. 1785, 21 U. S. C. A. Sec. 348.
27 The matter of color additives, however, is still pending at this writing,
although it appears that the law will be essentially similar to the food
additives amendments.




The Congress, in the light of the contradictory views of the
eminently qualified scientists who testified, concluded that a "fair
evaluation" of the entire record must be set as the new standard
of judicial review. 29 This replaces "substantial evidence," and
the reason is that Congress felt that the testimony of any one of
the scientists would be substantial evidence, but it was obviously
not enough. This was urged by manufacturers who feared one-
sided decisions by the Secretary, based predominantly on the con-
victions of scientists within the Department.
"Food additives" covers a wide variety of things including
radiation, but excludes such accidental contaminants as paint or
cleaning fluid which would be covered by the general provisions
of the 1938 Act. In deciding on tolerance levels no additive shall
be deemed safe if found to induce cancer.3 0 This so-called De-
laney Amendment seems to fall in the same class of statutes as
the coal tar colors. It reads:
(3) No such regulation [prescribing conditions under which
an additive may be safely used] shall issue if a fair evaluation
of the data before the Secretary-(A) fails to establish that
the proposed use of the food additive, under the conditions
of use to be specified in the regulation, will be safe: Provided,
that no additive shall be deemed to be safe if it is found to
induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if it is
found, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation
of the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man or
animal ....
In the Senate Committee report 3' it is stated:
We applaud Congressman Delaney for having taken this, as
he has every other opportunity, to focus our attention on the
cancer producing potentialities of various substances, but we
want the record to show that in our opinion the bill is aimed
at preventing the addition to the food our people eat of any
substances the ingestion of which reasonable people would
expect to produce, not just cancer, but any disease or dis-
ability. In short we believe the bill reads and means the
same with or without the inclusion of the clause referred to.
This is also the view of the Food and Drug Administration.
This no-cancer clause has actually turned out to be as strict
as it appears to be. The "cranberry incident" of the 1959 holiday
season3 2 arose because of the discovery of very slight residues of
a carcinogenic substance. Indeed, the attitude of Secretary Arthur
Fleming has been thoroughly against permission of any amount
of a carcinogen in food, quite the contrary to the idea that the
29 Id. at Secs. 348 (f) (2) and 348 (g) (3).
30 Id. at Sec. 348 (c) (3) (A).
31 Senate Report No. 2422, Aug. 18, 1958, 3 U. S. Code, Cong., and Adm.
News 5301, 5309.
82 See 255 Food, Drug, Cosm. L. R. 1 (Nov. 16, 1959).
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statute would read the same without the clause. The clause has
brought objections not only from industry,3 3 but also from the
Department of Agriculture.34 Both are concerned with the possi-
bility of losing large sums of money on research in chemicals
which by some superfine test of the future may show up in food
and be banned because they are carcinogenic when fed in large
quantities to rats. It is a matter of degree, and opponents of the
clause argue that carcinogens should be treated as any other
toxic substance. The Secretary does not believe that a little bit
of cancer is all right, and he is supported by cancer experts at
the National Institutes of Health. He has gone only so far as to
ask for modification of the Delaney Amendment to the extent of
permitting cancer-causing agents such as stilbestrol (widely used
for fattening cattle) on animal feeds where no residue appears in
the meat. It is said that without such fattening agents the price
of meat might increase 10%.35
The President asked for the creation of a special board to
help in evaluating scientific evidence.30 This is in keeping with
the fair evaluation standard provided by Congress.
Pending a new color additive law, Congress has enacted
special legislation permitting a new coal tar color, Citrus Red No.
2, to be used on oranges until September 1, 1961.3 7
The policy indicated by Congress, except for the Delaney
Amendment, is one of liberalizing the use of additives-by placing
the big decisions in the hands of the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare. Under the President's proposal this would
finally be a decision by a board of scientists. On 'the whole this
is a reasonable way of handling a very difficult problem. It should
result in decisions uninfluenced by political, social or economic
views, but it is hard to imagine that such decisions will be free
from personal probability judgments. If such judgments are
adverse to important groups in the future, will it result in more
special legislation of the kind obtained by the citrus fruit in-
dustry?
Warranty Cases
We now consider briefly some theories of warranty expressed
by courts "case book" cases. These cases serve an important pur-
pose in demonstrating the reasoning of the courts; hence they ap-
pear in case books. We will narrow the consideration to implied
warranty. If a vendor wishes to make an express warranty as
to the harmlessness of his product, that is his privilege. On the
other hand, where negligence exists, no one would deny liability,
in principle at least. But in the field of implied warranty, im-
33 86 No. 9 Chemical Week 21 (Feb. 27, 1960).
34 86 No. 14 Id. at 15 (Apr. 2, 1960).
35 86 No. 8 Id. at 44 (Feb. 20, 1960).
36 This release appeared nationally in newspapers May 15, 1960.




posed by law, there is much of policy considerations, and it is of
some interest to inquire as to what this could lead to. Develop-
ment of the law along these and other lines has been thoroughly
examined elsewhere. 38 We propose only to examine some of the
reasoning.
In Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc.,39 the court
found that loaves baked with pins in them are not merchantable
quality-a wholly reasonable conclusion. However in this case
liability attached to the immediate seller who was not respon-
sible. Furthermore, the customer had asked for the bread by its
trade name. This liberal construction of the Uniform Sales Act
was defended in part by suggesting that this seller could recover
in turn from the manufacturer; but unless this holding is really
based on the desire to provide a remedy where direct action is
barred against the manufacturer because of privity considera-
tions, the recovery-in-turn principle is rather tenuous. If the
holding stands on its own, it would mean that a food processor
whose product contained an approved additive would be liable
for any untoward consequences arising from its use. There is
one possible distinguishing feature, and that is as to when the
product becomes unmerchantable. Bread with pins baked in it
would not in general have been merchantable at any time. How-
ever, food containing an additive which turns out to be harmful
in spite of all precautions, does not become unmerchantable until
it is found to be harmful. Until such time it will pass in the mar-
ket under its general description.
Another theory is simple public policy not to permit un-
wholesome food to be sold. Such was the case in Jacob E. Decker
& Sons, Inc. v. Capps.40 In a jurisdiction which accepts the policy
of the Federal Government as its own public policy, it would ap-
pear that no liability would be incurred by the use of an approved
food additive. (Of course continued use after knowledge of de-
fect would be negligence.)
Where public policy or a theory of implied warranty based
on reliance of the buyer on the seller is applied one might ask:
On whom does the buyer rely? Is it actually the seller or is it
the United States Government? But who put the stuff in the food
in the first place? Actually the government serves primarily to
protect the public, not to recommend additives. (This point is
immediately complicated by the fact that the Department of
Agriculture is actually recommending substances that find their
way into food.)
The whole question is complicated still further by the pres-
ence of public demand direct or indirect for at least the end re-
sult of food additive utilization. That is to say, that many of
38 See Holdridge, Law of Manufacturer's Liability, 8 Clev-Mar. L. R. 14
(1959).
39 Supra note 2.
40 Supra note 3.
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today's foods that are put up in a form for easy preparation would
not be available without food additives. And of course we should
not forget the problem of the citrus industry to sell uncolored
oranges. It does not appear that present theories of implied war-
ranty are well enough developed to work justice in the case we
have contemplated here.
Science, Law, and Common Sense
In the light of the foregoing discussion of the scientific prob-
lem and of judicial and legislative policy, we now turn to the
question of what is the best course to follow. We continue to
break down the subject into evidence of cause and effect on the
one hand and policy considerations on the other.
The point that was made in the section on statistical infer-
ence was that any considered opinion must take into account the
design of the experiment or survey, and must ultimately rest on
some statement of the probability of the observed result happen-
ing by chance alone. Now, while the mathematics of statistics
may be difficult, and while the elements of experimental design
are often subtle, when the results are properly presented they are
not beyond the comprehension of ordinary man. Nor would con-
tention over significance of design elements be especially likely to
confuse him. And certainly he is as well qualified as any expert
to weigh the odds. Hence we submit that the jury should not
be permitted to draw any conclusions based on expert opinion
alone when statistically derived results are available. Let the
forum consider the propriety of the design and the weight of the
probabilities rather than the credibility of the witness.
In the absence of such results the only question we can con-
sider is whether there is any possibility of a cause and effect re-
lation. Any opinion as to the strength of the possibility is im-
proper because it does not meet the test of statistical inference.
The situation is analogous to testimony in a personal injury suit.
It is not really science. When the situation comes to this, should
opinion evidence be allowed at all when entire industries and
millions of people are involved? In a recent case the court di-
rected a verdict for the defendant where the plaintiff alleged that
he had contracted lung cancer from smoking defendant's ciga-
rettes.41 This case typifies the problem we have considered here.
The opinions and further development on appeal should be highly
enlightening.
The attitudes involved in policy considerations are demon-
strated in a journalistic debate appearing in Chemical Processing
Magazine.4 2 Here Gordon Weyermuller set out to answer an
article by columnist Jack Mabley entitled A Poison Death for All
41 Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., Pittsburgh Fed. Distr. Ct.,
May 4, 1960 (A. P. dispatch).





of Us?43 Mabley observed that chemicals are present in our food,
and that we really do not know what their cumulative effect over
a period of years will be. This is a point well taken. Weyermuller
replied that Mabley, not being a chemist, lacked understanding
of the complex subject of his article. But does Weyermuller
fully understand it himself? He remarks that food itself is a
chemical (a banality) and that many natural ingredients of food
would be poisonous by themselves. However, this brings out an
important distinction between natural ingredients and unnatural
ones. Mankind has had countless generations in which to de-
velop immunity to the natural constituents of his diet in the
amounts in which they ordinarily occur.
Mabley was disturbed by the chemicals in water. Weyer-
muller pointed out that they are put there to prevent the scourge
of impure water. This reason is hard to challenge.
Mabley was impressed by the fact that in America, life ex-
pectancy at birth is near the top, but at 40 it is near the bottom.
A logical explanation for this is not hard to find. In other so-
cieties for the most part only the hardiest babies survive. How-
ever, neither this explanation nor one which places the blame on
food additives is warranted except as a hypothesis. Similarly,
Mabley notes that an increase in the cancer death rate and a
progressive deterioration of the national health coincides with
the introduction of chemical poisons into the food supply, but he
never pauses to weigh the consequences of eliminating these so-
called poisons. He makes another good point, though, in bringing
out the variation in effect on different people. Furthermore, there
is little opportunity for people who simply want to avoid modified
food to do so, and in fact it may be difficult even to determine
whether a certain material has been added or not. It would seem
that in the interests of good faith and self protection manufac-
turers ought to list all ingredients. In any case, until all effects
of a food additive are known, and in the absence of an effective
system of notice, the only wise policy is clearly to protect the
most susceptible. A large factor of safety in setting tolerances
is indicated.
Weyermuller countered Mabley's somewhat alarmist ob-
servations with the statement that only one death has been defi-
nitely attributed to a food additive, and it was clearly misused.
He naturally enough considers the consequences of eliminating
chemicals from food. He feels that thousands of lives have been
saved through the use of chemicals in processing food. In fact
he says that it is certainly known that it would be extremely
harmful to bar chemicals from food. He offers as a lone example
the use of chemical sanitizers to keep milk germ free from milk-
ing parlor to consumer's table. He does not defend his statement
as to the countless other food additives in common use. Weyer-
muller is chiefly concerned about the reputation of the chemical
43 Chicago Daily News, March 18, 1960.
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industry, and in that context he goes on to remind the reader of
the great benefits to life which that industry has contributed.
However, this only diverts attention away from the real problem
raised by Mabley. Weyermuller points with pride to the exhaus-
tive tests conducted in industry laboratories to check the safety
of chemicals-to which we simply say they had better!
There are certain other aspects of the problem which should
not be overlooked. Consider for example that fats and cholesterol
have been indicted as a cause of heart and arterial disease. These
are perfectly natural foods. It is said that part of America's poor
national health picture arises from a high standard of living
which permits of more rich living. These associations are as
justified as those made with food additives and national health.
It must be admitted that food additives have become popular
in convenience foods, and in a sense are demanded although in-
directly where they reduce costs. It may be that there is a na-
tional assumption of risk, which can perhaps best be illustrated
by an analogy. Consider the great care taken in maintaining
and operating the President's private plane. If this care were ex-
tended to commercial aircraft, it is likely that aircraft fatalities
would be reduced. It appears that we accept something less in
the interests of economy and convenience.
Probably the best ground on which to judge an additive is
its purpose. If it is used primarily to cut manufacturers' costs
without any material benefit in kind to the consumer, it is not
justifiable. If there is a non-essential benefit to the consumer
such as a matter of texture or convenience, it should at least be
possible to avoid it. If there is a benefit connected with safety
as is the case with preservatives and water treatment, the use
is justified in that the benefit outweighs the risk, but even so
this does not mean that research to find something better is un-
necessary.
It was in connection with research that Mabley made his
most telling point. The FDA has a research budget of $2.9 mil-
lion to protect the safety of America. The Department of Ag-
riculture research budget runs to some $139 million mostly for
economic purposes. Does this reveal our national policy?
The conclusion is inescapable that our best protection lies in
a vastly increased amount of research on food additives. This
would undoubtedly also yield valuable incidental benefits. Those
who are most concerned about food additives could hardly do
better than to work for an increase in this much needed research.
Sept., 1960
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